What can a major company learn from the sports world? I am not thinking here about inspirational speeches from a coach or anything like that. Rather, can people with a background in sports competition actually offer ways of improving business processes?
It turns out the answer to that question is yes as the Financial Times reports in discussing McClaren Applied Technologies relationship with GlaxoSmithKline (McLaren speeds up GSK with racetrack expertise, Dec 10). That’s McClaren as in Formula 1 racing and they have turned their expertise in organizing pit crews and monitoring racing cars into a side consulting business. In the case of GSK, they have produced some interesting results.
Perhaps the clearest dividend of the partnership so far has come not in drug development but in GSK’s consumer healthcare business. McLaren was asked to scrutinise a toothpaste manufacturing facility in Maidenhead and work out how to boost efficiency.
“We noticed that they were making lots of small batches of different products with a lot of down time in between,” says Mr McGrath. “They said: ‘If you can change four tyres on a racing car in two seconds why does it take us two hours to do a changeover?’”
Within a year, lost time had been cut by 60 per cent, using principles similar to those that govern the pit-stops for Mr Button’s racing car. “It’s about everyone knowing their job and doing it well,” says Mr McGrath. “Afterwards, we analyse every detail — what went well, what didn’t and how we can improve.”
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The history of manufacturing is to some extent the history of substituting capital for labor. Devising a way of making things that is more reliant on equipment (or an organizing principle like the Ford assembly line) allows workers to be more productive and generate more output per hour worked. But capital requires, you know, capital. Adding new equipment like robots requires an upfront investment and having that investment payoff depends on scale at which the business operates. Big firms like Roger-&-Me era GM can afford robots even if they have limited capabilities but smaller firms have a harder time taking the plunge. Until now that is, if the Wall Street Journal is to be believed (Robots Work Their Way Into Small Factories, Sep 17).
Robots have been on factory floors for decades. But they were mostly big machines that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and had to be caged off to keep them from smashing into humans. Such machines could only do one thing over and over, albeit extremely fast and precisely. As a result, they were neither affordable nor practical for small businesses.
Collaborative robots can be set to do one task one day—such as picking pieces off an assembly line and putting them in a box—and a different task the next. …
Small businesses often need flexibility “because they’re not just packaging cookies endlessly,” says Dan Kara, a robotics expert at ABI research, a market-research firm in Oyster Bay, N.Y.
Here is a graphic of describing some of the machines discussed in the article.
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Reshoring — moving manufacturing from far-flung global locations back to the US — has been a popular topic both in the general press and on this blog. What’s not to like about it? As long as manufacturing allows average humans without extreme degrees of education or super rare skills to make a decent wage, new employment opportunities in manufacturing are always going to create a buzz.
But just what kind of firms are bringing work back to the States? According to the Wall Street Journal, we are mostly talking about smaller enterprises (Bringing Jobs Back to U.S. Is Bruising Task, Jun 25).
More than 80% of companies bringing work back to the U.S. have $200 million or less in sales, according to the Reshoring Initiative, a nonprofit that encourages companies to return production to the U.S. Many supply parts to bigger companies or, if they sell directly to consumers, are seeking to cut out lengthy supply chains from Asia.
But big companies have the resources and experience to hopscotch around the globe. It’s harder and riskier for small firms to do the same.
So for every General Electric moving appliance manufacturing back to Kentucky, you have lots of firms like Chesapeake Bay Candle dealing with much smaller product lines. To some extent this is not too surprising. Whether you are GE or Chesapeake Bay Candle, managing a long supply chain or navigating cultural differences is nontrivial. One of those firms, however, can much more easily absorb the cost of having in country staff or can resort to throwing around its sizable weight to get a good deal. Further, a multinational like GE can also have ambitions of growing in China that may not be a priority for a small player like Chesapeake Bay Candle.
While it is not surprising that smaller firms play a big role in reshoring, that is also a problem. (more…)
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Today’s Wall Street Journal has a special section on “Unleashing Innovation in Manufacturing”. Among the more interesting pieces is a report on Roland DG, a Japanese manufacturer of industrial goods like wide format printers, milling machines and vinyl cutters. These all sound like boxes of metal filled with electrical components that should be built up by a team of workers as they move down an assembly line. But that is not how Roland DG rolls. Instead, they have each machine built by one person guided by a computer that displays instructions, makes sure the correct hardware is presented, and monitors what is done through a networked screwdriver (Japanese Firm Uses a Single-Worker System to Make Its Products, Jun 1).
On a recent day in Roland DG’s factory in Hamamatsu, a city in central Japan, one employee was assembling from scratch an industrial printer that ultimately would be more than twice her size and weigh almost 900 pounds. Another worker who had just joined the company’s fleet of part-timers was making a prototype milling machine. Yet another was assembling the dental-crown milling machine.
A computer monitor displays step-by-step instructions along with 3-D drawings: “Turn Screw A in these eight locations” or “Secure Part B using Bracket C.” At the same time, the rotating parts rack turns to show which of the dozens of parts to use. Meanwhile, a digital screwdriver keeps track of how many times screws are turned and how tightly. Until the correct screws are turned the correct number of times, the instructions on the computer screen don’t advance to the next step.
Workers are rarely confused, but when they are, there’s a button to press that will bring the floor manager running to help.
This video gives an idea of the system in actions.
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When you thing of the auto industry, you likely focus on big players like Ford, General Motors, Toyota and Mercedes. Names like Magna International and Denso may not mean a whole lot to you. But you should know those names. They likely make more of your car than you realize. “Mega suppliers” like Magna and Denso have been growing for years and in the process have been sifting the balance of power in the industry (Age of mega supplier heralds danger for carmakers, Financial Times, May 18).
There are now 16 major car manufacturers that sell more than 1m vehicles a year. But those cars are built from parts supplied by just 10 major component makers – meaning that under the individually styled bodywork, cars are sharing more parts.
Whether a driver chooses to buy a BMW, an Audi or a Mercedes-Benz five-door saloon, the chances are high that the anti-lock brakes will be built by Continental, the battery will come from Johnson Controls, and Denso will have provided the exhaust
Bosch, the world’s largest automotive supplier by revenue, reckons that at least one of its parts is built into almost every new car sold anywhere in the world – regardless of brand, market, price point or geography.
The article goes on to note that the top ten suppliers capture 60% of the revenue generated by the top 100 suppliers.
Given this situation, two questions seem relevant. First, how did automakers find themselves in this situation? Second, what are the implications for how the industry functions? (more…)
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Reshoring has been a popular topic. It’s a lot more fun to talk about optimistic stories of manufacturing and its associated jobs returning to the US (or to high wage developed nations in general) than to focus on companies sending jobs overseas in search of cheaper labor. But how does reshoring go in practice? Once a company commits to bringing work back to the States, how easy it to get a factory up and running?
As the Wall Street Journal tells it, reshoring is not a walk in the park, at least not for United Technologies’ Otis Elevator (Otis Finds ‘Reshoring’ Manufacturing Is Not Easy, May 2).
The company’s move to relocate an Otis elevator plant from Mexico to South Carolina in late 2012 was hailed as a sign of a small renaissance in American manufacturing. The relocation was supposed to save money and help fill orders faster by putting the people who make new elevators next to the engineers who design them, and their customers.
Now, it’s clear the reality hasn’t been so smooth. Production delays created a backlog of overdue elevators. Some customers canceled their orders after being left waiting months, people in the elevator industry said. The plant Otis was leaving behind in Nogales, Mexico, had to stay open for half a year beyond its planned closing date to deal with the backlog.
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I am one of those American who is adamantly uninterested in soccer. However, I have to admit that the process of making soccer balls might be interesting. More specifically it can be interesting when a bunch of researchers mess with how it is done.
It turns out that Pakistan is a big player in soccer ball production, as this graph from the Wall Street Journal shows (How Automation Fell Flat in the World’s Soccer-Ball Capital, Apr 28).
As the figure demonstrates, Chinese have been putting pressure on the Pakistanis in part by machine sewing balls while most Pakistani balls are hand stitched (see here for more on that). You would think that would make Pakistani manufacturers anxious for any process innovation that would let them reduce cost and compete with the Chinese.
In that context, enter a group of economists who have better way to cut the faux leather that makes up the ball. Here is their explanation of the innovation (from the Center for Development Economics and Policy at Columbia).
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